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Abstract
This paper challenges the methodological adherence to institutional stability of the 
“Varieties of Capitalism” approach by showing that constant change pressure caused by ‘neg-
ative EU integration’ has, indeed, profoundly affected the German system of corporate con-
trol. Over the past years, European institutions have been striving to create a common mar-
ket for corporate control in order to make the EU the world’s most competitive economic 
area. Europe’s push for liberalization, however, has not only affected the German system of 
corporate control itself, but also undermined patterns of the German financial system and 
system of industrial relations. Building on the assumption of institutional complementarities 
it is argued that if adjustment pressure is put on one element of a country’s political economy, 
other parts will not remain unaffected. Will the German coordinated market economy con-
verge towards a more liberal capitalist system?
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For a half-century after its emergence during the post-war construction period, the 
German political economy was notably stable and resistant to any form of substantial re-
form pressure. Notwithstanding economic turbulence in the 1970s and 1980s, Germany 
celebrated itself as an “island of economic prosperity” (Kitschelt & Streeck, 2003, p. 1) and 
successfully managed to bridge principles of social protection and free market rule (Soziale 
Marktwirtschaft). The “middle way” (Schmidt, 2001) between a Scandinavian welfare state and 
Anglo-American turbo capitalism (Leibfried & Obinger, 2003, p. 199) laid the groundwork 
for a well-functioning economic system often referred to as the “German Model” (Esser, 
1996). In the 1990s, however, this harmonious picture started crumbling. As soon as Ger-
many was exposed to greatly increased international competition and the globalization of 
markets, its institutions suddenly were faced by growing adjustment pressure.
It comes as no surprise that the reshaping of German capitalism has been thoroughly 
discussed by the scholarship of the past twenty or so years. Most research suggests that in-
ternationalization – a term often remaining vague – has forced the German nation state to 
recalibrate its market equilibrium according to Anglo-Saxon standards, a process which has 
affected a wide set of the political economy’s basic elements. Another approach, though, 
traces domestic change back to the effects of European integration. While this concept is put 
forward by far fewer studies, I argue it might serve as a much better conceptual gateway of 
change than internationalization alone.
Building on the notion that “Europeanization”, in fact, has led to the erosion of Ger-
man capitalism, I aim to highlight the role of EU integration in reshaping the German po-
litical economy, and thus call the stability-hypothesis of the “German Model” into question. 
Furthermore, I aim not only to bring the study of Europeanization “back to the table”, but 
also to situate it within the debate on the “Varieties of Capitalism” (or VoC). Both approaches 
still stand apart from each other despite their common focus on the question of whether a 
clash of systems might initiate a process of convergence (Callaghan, 2010). In other words, 
I assume that the EU’s push for liberalizing national markets does not coincide by accident 
with Germany’s partial system change, which is commonly captured by the VoC literature.
The VoC approach allows one not only to analyze what aspects of the German political 
economy seem to have been “under attack” by EU integration, but also to link those change 
processes with one another. In fact, many developments within the architecture of German 
capitalism have been addresses separately by scholars when they should have been analyzed 
jointly. Accordingly, I argue in favor of an analysis that de-centers the study of change from a 
narrow focus on either element and that sets them in relation to each other. The hypothesis 
underlying this study is that Europeanization will lead to the creation of a market for corporate con-
trol that will alter basic principles of both the financial system and industrial relations.
The study proceeds as follows: Part one sets out the analytical framework along which 
the German political economy can be classified. This is followed by a brief outline of the 
discussion on convergence and concluded by the idea that some form of cohesion among 
political economies is to be expected considering the high degree of pressure for liberaliza-
tion. Section three illustrates the argument with a short description of why Europeanization 
is the gateway of change, followed by two case studies in part four. The conclusion highlights 
the key results of and sums up the most striking findings from the previous sections.
1. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities
Capitalism versus capitalism – For decades scholars have been intrigued by the question 
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why diversity among capitalist systems exists and to what degree this diversity accounts for 
a country’s economic performance. At some point in the 1950s, research ceased to suggest 
unanimously that capitalism’s only counterpart was not communism, but capitalism itself. 
The first to study capitalist diversity was Andrew Shonfield who in his book “Modern Capi-
talism” (1965) compared several world economies, including Great Britain and Germany, 
and laid out why some countries did well while others lagged behind. Quickly, literature 
on the “models of capitalism” mushroomed. Inspired by Shonfield’s widely noticed study, 
French author Michel Albert took up the idea of a bipolar world of capitalism and suggested 
a distinction between a ‘Rhenish-Alpine-Japanese’ and a ‘neo-American’ model in his 1993 
“Capitalism vs. Capitalism”. This approach was picked up more recently by Hall and Soskice’s 
(2001) often quoted “Varieties of Capitalism”. In the latter, capitalist diversity across nations is 
conceptualized along two basic types of political economies, the liberal (LME) and coordi-
nated market economy (CME), which differ by reference to the way in which firms resolve 
coordination problems. 
In this study, I will borrow from Hall and Soskice’s VoC approach and regard Germany 
as a paradigm case for a CME. Unlike other studies, though, I do not seek to assess the 
strengths and weaknesses of either system but to analyze why and how one system might 
converge towards its assumed counterpart. In the subsequent paragraphs, I will provide a 
brief introduction into the VoC concept and portray its most essential features.
The VoC approach builds on the assumption that cross-national variations in econo-
mies may be best traced back to institutional differences among CMEs and LMEs. In coordi-
nated market economies like Germany, firms coordinate their endeavors through non-market 
mechanisms such as corporate networks (inter-firm- and bank-client networks) and insti-
tutionalized negotiations (tripartite rounds and bilateral wage bargaining). Established ar-
rangements and long-term inter industry relationships are said to allow for stable production 
structures that are less sensitive to changing market conditions. In liberal market economies, 
in contrast, supply and demand of goods and services is balanced through price competition 
rather than “close-knit corporate networks” (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 29). 
It is noteworthy that the “models of capitalism thought to generate comparative (…) 
advantage[s] are not just random configurations of rules but display so-called institutional 
complementarities” (Callaghan, 2010, p. 567). Referencing work in economics, it is assumed 
that institutional complementarities reinforce basic differences between CMEs and LMEs. 
The extensive use of highly trained workforces in CMEs, for example, is backed up by a 
sector-specific vocational training system tailored to the corresponding firms’ needs (see 
section four for details).
The interplay of institutional complementarities, according to the ‘Varieties approach’, 
generates certain comparative advantages which lay the groundwork for firms to engage in 
a specific production system. Keeping to the above example, a firm will specialize in the 
production of cars and heavy machinery as long as it can do so in a more efficient way than 
others. Efficiency in this kind of production may result from the access to highly qualified 
workers, as is the case in Germany. Simply put, firms will engage in a way for which they 
receive ‘institutional support’, which is why a system that has once set on a path will not 
easily deviate from the status quo without further incentive.
Now, there is one good side to this line of argumentation and one that needs to be 
revised:
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i. Institutional complementarities not only allow for a stable production 
regime, they also serve as an analytical tool to examine interdependencies be-
tween one element of a political economy and another. In part four, I will make 
extensive use of this tool. 
ii. According to Hall and Soskice, institutional path dependency will make 
system change impossible and a fortiori rules out that one system might converge 
towards the other. However, empirical evidence will prove this not necessarily to 
be true.
To sum it up, capitalist systems differ with regard to the institutional setting they are 
built on and are thus often believed to be fairly resistant to adjustment pressure. Opposing 
this view, I will follow recent research and argue that change is not only possible but is ac-
tually happening. Hence, the next section will outline under which circumstances system 
change is to be expected.  
2. The Study of Change: Convergence and Liberalization
Over the past few years, the focus of debate among scholars has shifted to one question: 
Will international integration drive all economies towards one market model that will ab-
sorb all previously existing market equilibriums? Against this notion, some believe that insti-
tutional stability, which is key to the understanding of capitalist diversity, will shield systems 
from any external threat, be it globalization or Europeanization. They argue that procedures, 
rules and norms that shape market organization are backed up by a social bloc, which would 
not easily withdraw its support. As outlined above, this is so because firms, which are the 
single most important actor, rely on one or the other form of market organization since they 
are intertwined with the existing institutional setting. In short, there is little room for abrupt 
adjustment. Other scholars, however, oppose this view by pointing out recent developments, 
such as the increase of investment banking, shareholder value, new accounting standards and 
short-term investments. All of these examples suggest that firms are slowly yet surely shifting 
towards the Anglo-American business model. Clearly, the literature at hand does not have a 
unanimous view on the issue of convergence.
Now, it is vital to bear in mind that systems in historical perspective have always been 
subject to change. Throughout the world, political economies have manifested themselves as 
hybrid models rather than monolith blocs. As Gourevitch (1996, pp. 240-241) shows, there 
was a time when US-capitalism had significant elements of the Rhenish model and when 
Japan moved to become a system most akin to that of Germany. Furthermore, according to 
the study of Europeanization, there is little reason to believe that traditions regardless of their 
persistence should be completely immune to either domestic or international forces.
While one can therefore reasonably assume that a political economy might partially 
change, it is a fact that the congruence-hypothesis remains far too often unclear with regard to 
definition: Convergence; but where to? Will there be one ‘best-practice’ system all the others 
will gravitate toward? Or will both CMEs and LMEs somehow synthesize and create some 
form of a mixed type? In fact, scholars have advocated both approaches and underpinned 
their argument with empirical findings. For the sake of clarity, however, I will define conver-
gence as “a process in which a CME is forced to absorb substantial elements of its LME-counterpart 
in order better to fit the globalized economic order”. Interestingly enough, support for this notion 
comes from the “Varieties of Capitalism” itself. While Hall and Soskice deny ‘congruence’ as 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/8
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a matter of principle, they acknowledge transformation in some instances: “Because market 
relations do not demand the same levels of common knowledge, however, there is no such 
constraint on CMEs deregulation to become more like LMEs” (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. 
63). With this, they confirm scholarly expectations according to which liberalization does 
promote change.
Liberalization: The trigger of change?
As follows from the last sub-chapter, congruence, if it occurs at all, may result from the 
process of liberalization1 of coordinated market economies. In most studies, it is argued that 
the inflow of Anglo-American business rationales – a side effect of market opening measures 
– challenges systems of organized capitalism and thus causes adoption. This phenomenon is 
sometimes referred to as the “rise of the phoenix” (Cohen, 1996) connoting the dramatic 
resurrection of global finance after World War II. As a result, CMEs may find themselves in 
a process of metamorphosis, gradually turning into their counterpart and increasingly being 
blown off their former path.
Liberalization, however, does not arise from nowhere nor is it a random effect possibly 
caused by globalization. It is a self-induced, bottom-up initiated and moderated intervention 
in an existing order, directed at removing obstacles to trade, competition and market integra-
tion. To this extent it would be a narrow view to assume that some ‘external’ developments 
threaten CMEs. It is rather the interplay of domestic and international factors that underpin 
change. In the case in question, indeed, the gateway of liberalization is Brussels As Schmidt 
(2002, pp. 39-41) points out, “changes related to globalization cannot be considered in isola-
tion from those related to the regionalism concerning European integration. (…) Europe-
anization has been inextricably linked to globalization in the set of liberal, capitalist ideas”.
3. Gateway of Change: Europeanization
The recalibration of German capitalism can hardly be traced back to one single factor 
only. Rather, evidence suggests that the orientation towards a greater market economy is af-
fected by “simultaneous and reciprocally reinforcing, complementary developments (Beyer 
& Höpner, 2003, p. 180). Thanks to a large number of studies we know a great deal about the 
factors underpinning the change process, while the plethora of approaches, at the same time, 
makes it difficult to identify the factors that really cause change. According to Höpner (2001), 
scholars have suggested three main gateways of Anglo-Saxon production-system elements: 
financial internationalization, shareholder value orientation (Höpner & Schäfer, 2010) and 
domestic factors (Kitschelt & Streeck, 2003).
All of the above approaches suggest that adaptation pressure, when constantly exerted 
on the nation state, will inevitably lead to the exhaustion of organized capitalism and con-
sequently give rise to the erosion of its institutional basis. In fact, I assume that one or more 
of these processes do take place and above all, work in tandem. Far too rare, however, are the 
attempts to construct an analytical framework that seeks to capture the manifold mechanisms 
in one comprehensive concept. Accordingly, drawing on latest research, I advocate shifting 
the focus away from “internationalization” towards the effects of European integration on 
organized capitalism (see Höpner & Schäfer, 2010). This approach builds on three assump-
1 Liberalization usually refers either to the reduction of government interference in market processes or to deregu-
lation policies aimed at strengthening private entities.
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tions, which will be set out in the following sections:
i. Europeanization is a sui generis case of internationalization
ii. Europeanization actively promotes market opening (‘negative integration’)
iii. Europeanization aims at harmonizing systems of corporate control
In short, the Europeanization hypothesis does not substitute mechanisms commonly 
referred to as internationalization, nor does it suggest that other mechanisms are not at work. 
As has been argued earlier, domestic transformation is a multicausal process that involves a 
whole set of both internal and external factors with each of them reinforcing each other. The 
Europeanization hypothesis, though, seeks to add another perspective to the debate on the 
varieties of capitalism as it argues that the push towards congruence did not randomly come 
about but was rather actively fostered.
3.1. Europeanization, internationalization, and liberalization
In its simplest sense, Europeanization may be defined as a sui generis case of interna-
tionalization. While the latter refers solely to the opening of national markets along with the 
“increase in cross-border transactions, social relations and structures” (Bouwen, 2006, p. 178), 
Europeanization adds a dimension of “obligation”. Simply put, “Europeanisation is (…) a 
process of domestic political change caused (somehow) by the process of European integra-
tion” (Vink, 2003, p. 72)2. Unlike other international regimes, though, the European Union 
has been equipped with a large arsenal of supranational controls over public policy, making 
EU officials capable of enacting legislation that is binding on the member states. This, how-
ever, distinguishes the EU from any other form of transnational cooperation, which usually 
builds on voluntary agreements. “[W]hether a decision comes out of treaty negotiations, 
Council directives, or of the ECJ, once it is decided it becomes an adjustment pressure for 
all member state since all must implement the decision” (Schmidt, 2002, p. 86). It is for that 
reason that Europeanization appears to be a better conceptual gateway of liberalization than 
globalization or internationalization only.
3.2. Europeanization and the early phase of ‘negative integration’
The link between European integration and liberalization arises from the EU’s past. 
Ever since its emergence in the 1950s, the European Union (or formerly European Com-
munity, EC) has constantly been rebuilding itself. While the EU’s founding principles were 
built on the vision of a political unity and cooperation (e.g., ‘Schuman plan’) they have been 
undermined by the strengthening of the economic direction of further integration that 
political elites have stressed in the 1960s. Many argue that with the creation of the single 
market Europe has been blown off its path to a political union and recent developments 
provide striking evidence for this. However, Europe’s push for liberalization did not arise 
accidentally but resulted from the failure of macroeconomic management during the eco-
nomic turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s. In the search for a political solution to the crisis EC 
authorities implemented corporatist mechanisms, as they were believed to boost economic 
2 The literature on Europeanization most commonly points to domestic change in cases of national nonconformity 
with European rules or norms. Accordingly, most scholars agree on the assumption that incongruence between 
the supranational and national level is the necessary condition for any form of adaptation pressure that originates 
from the EU (Sturm & Pehle, 2005; Börzel & Risse, 2000; Cowles, 2001). Likewise, the same mechanism is at work 
behind the ‘congruence-hypothesis’.
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growth and promote social stability. As the EU kept struggling with the economic situation 
and steadily failed to combat unemployment, those mechanisms were quickly repealed and 
decision-making power was shifted back to the domestic level3 (see Gorges, 1996, ch. 5 and 
6; Streeck & Schmitter, 1991, pp. 143-145). 
Finally, the poor economic performance of the EC’s key member states Germany, 
France and Great Britain raised popular doubts as to whether the ‘European idea’ was worth 
sticking to; in sum, “Euroscepticism” had its heyday. Hence, a further trigger of liberalization 
was ideological. The Anglo-Saxon market model enjoyed great popularity among European 
leaders during that time. Consequently, politics was driven by the idea of a new market-
based economy that would be able to solve the problems of the past (Moravcsik, 1991).
As soon as it became evident that further steps towards more integration would be 
possible only with regard to economic harmonization, the vision of a political union began 
slowly to disappear. From that time on, the creation of a common European market was 
declared the primary objective of European authorities and soon the EC would become the 
world’s largest free trade zone. In 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was ratified, which 
laid the groundwork for “the creation of a single market for (…) banking and insurance, a 
single legal framework for business (…) and the easing of restrictions on living and working 
in other member states” (Coen, 1997, p. 94). In the social sciences, this process is commonly 
captured by the umbrella term “negative integration”4, which denotes the removal of legal 
barriers such as custom duties that would interfere with free competition (Scharpf, 1999, 
pp. 43-84). Inherently linked to the creation of the single market is the free movement of 
goods, capital, services and people – the so-called “four liberties”. Finally, less than a decade 
later, authorities throughout the continent called for a common currency, the Euro, which 
was introduced slightly later as part of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU). 
From the early phase, the push toward liberalization was not only tolerated by national 
executives and parliaments but also actually actively promoted. To cite a case in point, Ger-
many has been extensively practicing what the Europeanization literature calls an ‘institution 
upload’, which is to say it designed respective institutions of macroeconomic management 
such as the EU’s central bank (ECB) according to domestic experiences (Deutsche Bundes-
bank). For example, the “EMU (…) has been little more than an extension to Europe and 
its member states of Germany’s own traditional macroeconomic patterns and prejudices” 
(Schmidt, 2002, p. 90) and thus did not interfere with national politics. Furthermore, Ger-
man actors ‘of all colors’ have been of outstanding importance for the “standard-setting in 
the European Single Market program” (Jeffery & Paterson, 2003, p. 61). Over the last fifteen 
years or so, the European Commission (COM) along with the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) have profoundly challenged Germany’s organized capitalism by over-prioritizing un-
distorted competition in a way that is clearly diametrical to the past. In the words of Jeffery 
and Paterson (2003, p. 66), [l]iberalization (…) now begins to hurt”.
3.3. Europeanization and the harmonization of corporate control
Traditional integration theory regards European institutions, particularly the COM 
and ECJ, as the “guardians of the Treaties”, the machinery behind integration and agents of 
3 However, due to a lack of control over fiscal and monetary policy tools, “Euro-corporatism” was never really 
‘properly’ implemented and might therefore have failed.
4 Positive integration, on the contrary, means the exercise of regulative competencies on the supranational level, 
which usually points to political measures that seek to ‘correct’ market forces
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national governments. Challenging this view, these institutions seemed to have emancipated 
themselves from the role of a passive “contractor” of integration and moved forward to be-
come political actors. At least, this is what recent developments suggest (e.g., the ruling of the 
ECJ in the cases of “Laval” and “Viking”). With regard to liberalization measures, the COM 
and ECJ have clearly developed its own rationales as they pushed market harmonization 
towards a new equilibrium bypassing the old status quo5. As Höpner and Schäfer (2010, p. 
344) show, recent policies imply that the EU “aim[s] at transforming national institutions and 
bringing them in line with the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism”. 
From that time on, the COM and ECJ have set the “four liberties” above all else and set 
out to combat anything that might interfere with the goal of promoting free markets, even 
though it is national institutions that supposedly bar the way to progress. Over the last few 
decades, the Commission has launched a set of initiatives aimed at creating a market for corporate 
control, which would lay the groundwork for hostile takeovers and consequently undermine 
basic institutions of Rhenish capitalism in Germany and elsewhere. In 2004, for example, EU 
institutions agreed on the “Directive on takeover bids” (2004/25/EC)6, whose purpose is to 
harmonize takeover processes across member states while emphasizing the rights of share-
holders. Only one year earlier, the COM had announced a communiqué entitled “Mod-
ernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A 
Plan to Move Forward” (COM (2003) 284 final)7 in which the Commission stressed the 
importance to “actively co-ordinate the corporate governance efforts” (p. 16) of EU member 
states. The EC plan has been repeatedly criticized for its one-sided goal to adjust regulatory 
systems in CMEs without addressing the question of how deregulation might affect essential 
aspects of coordinated market economies, for example codetermination (Kluge, 2007).
While national agendas have always been in line with COM and ECJ regulations 
with regard to market liberalization, this symbiosis has fallen apart in the case of takeover 
liberalization (Höpner & Schäfer, 2008, ch. 4; Callaghan & Höpner, 2005). For the first 
time, national authorities became aware of the effect European legislation might have on 
the continuity of “their” capitalist systems. Confirming scholarly expectation, political lead-
ers of organized capitalisms have opposed first drafts of the above mentioned EC directive 
(Höpner & Schäfer, 2010, pp. 354-357) as they might fear the loss of national peculiarities 
and comparative advantages and a too radical shift towards the Anglo-Saxon market model. 
Regardless of the political opposition that occasionally dropped in, organized capitalism 
across the EU indeed has changed. 
It should be noted that the integration of capital markets and the creation of a market 
for corporate control are still in motion, meaning neither one of the two processes has been 
finalized. And yet, the EU makes no secret of the fact that only a fully integrated financial 
market will guarantee a real European common market (see for example EC “Economic 
5 The status quo of European integration was established through the harmonization of product markets guaran-
teeing the free movement of goods and services. The European free trade zone encouraged countries to build on 
their ability to produce respective goods at lower marginal cost or, in other words, goods based on the principle of 
comparative advantages (Ricardian theory). As follows from Hall and Soskice’s VoC-approach, a Ricardian produc-
tion regime coincides with a country’s distinct capitalist order, since comparative advantages reinforce capitalist 
diversity and thus promote institutional stability. Consequently, national peculiarities remained largely unaffected 
by Europeanization.
6 Accessible through the “Official Journal of the European Union” online, accessed online on Jun 16, 2012.
7 Accessible online, accessed online on Jun 16, 2012.
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So why did we look at the role of EU integration in the process of market liberaliza-
tion? The purpose of this section was to show why and how Europeanization – and not 
simply internationalization – has initiated or at least propelled the clash of capitalisms as it 
is (1) binding on the nation state, (2) more effective both in depth and magnitude, and (3) 
politically intended. Furthermore, I argued that liberalization measures, while initially self-
induced, now begin to hurt. In light of the COM and ECJ becoming autonomous players in 
the supranational arena, one might ask dramatically: Have we opened the “box of Pandora”?
4. Case Study: A Market for Corporate Control and its Effects 
In section three, I showed that the EU has strived to create a market for corporate con-
trol, which would interfere with existing patterns in CMEs9. In this section, I shall analyze 
to what degree changes within the German system of corporate control may affect other 
parts of the political economy. This approach borrows from the assumption of institutional 
complementarities, saying that pressure for change directed at either element of a CME will 
provoke the whole system to change and finally promote convergence as defined earlier.
Figure 1: Research design
In the following case study, two elements of CMEs will be at the center of analysis: 
(i.) financial system and (ii.) industrial relations. Both of these are commonly considered es-
sential aspects of the German political economy, but there have been only few attempts to 
associate them with each other (e.g., research undertaken by Martin Höpner; Vitols, 2001). 
On the one hand we observe changes within the financial system that have been often linked 
to the ongoing liberalization of world markets. On the other hand, the gradual erosion of 
industrial relations has been usually traced back to the “modernization” of society (e.g., Leif 
& Speth, 2003a, ch. 3.3; Wehrmann, 2007, ch. 8). This appears to be unsatisfactory for several 
reasons. Above all, capitalism and corporatism in the German state are inherently linked and 
need thus to be analyzed jointly.
4.1. Corporate control and the financial system
Corporate control denotes the way a company is run. Is it an autonomous unit of the 
economy, committed only to rational goals such as profit maximization and efficiency (in 
LMEs), or is it an entity interwoven into “close-knit corporate networks” (Hall & Soskice, 
2001, p. 29), and thus committed to a stable production regime that generates profit only in 
8 Accessible online, accessed online on Jun 16, 2012.
9 Yet, this process is still in motion and surely has not been finalized. For this reason, the results from the following 
case study should neither be overemphasized nor should they be causally related to EU integration. As has often 
been repeated, processes of this kind should not be traced back to one factor alone but rather to be regarded as a 
complex interplay among different factors.
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the long-term (CMEs)? The way a company constitutes itself along these guidelines decides 
to what form of capital it will have access to and hence determines the “design” of the finan-
cial system. Conclusively, if the system of corporate governance deviates from its status quo, 
so will the financial system. To illustrate these interdependencies, I will first briefly set out 
key characteristics of each market model before drawing on past and recent developments 
that provide evidence for the notion that Germany’s financial systems clearly is in motion.
As touched upon on at some earlier point, in coordinated capitalism, industry and 
finance are marked by a high degree of collective functioning and a ‘classical’ banking con-
cept10. Banks play the key role in corporate finance; they lend money, own stock and are 
intertwined with their clients’ management11. Firms usually maintain a long-lasting relation-
ship to ‘their’ banks (Hausbankprinzip) and thus can rely upon the banks’ willingness to sup-
port longer term investment plans and grant low interest credits (Lütz, 2000, pp. 5-6). Banks 
assess a firm’s credibility based on internal information they gather in meetings of the super-
visory board they hold a seat in, which is to say they take co-entrepreneurial responsibility in 
order to exert influence on the debtor’s standing; they become insiders. These business-bank 
ties result, among others, from the fact that especially small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) – accounting for a large proportion of German business – lack the ability to finance 
themselves through issuing shares on the capital market (Vitols, 1998; Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2012, p. 23). Furthermore, basic opaqueness and a high level of discretion, which secures the 
confidentiality of business information, prevent banks from depending on short-term profit 
maximization and allow for farsighted investment strategies that emphasize long-term results 
(Lütz, 2000). 
In LMEs, on the contrary, investors from outside the company decide whether or not to 
invest in a company based on publicly available balance sheet data. Accordingly, investments 
are made based on the value of a company on the equity market. Unlike CMEs, company 
leaders are not necessarily supervised by a board consisting of bank personnel, workers’ 
representatives and others, but are accountable only to the shareholders. If the management 
fails to constantly boost the value of the shares emitted on the equity market, this company 
might become subject to fusion or (hostile) takeovers. It follows from there that the main 
difference between the financial system in CMEs and LMEs is the degree of market capitaliza-
tion with regard to a firm’s assets. A company may choose to finance itself either through 
bank credit (CMEs) or through the distribution of shares on the equity market (LMEs). In 
practice, of course, most firms do not rely on one form of capital only but consist of a mix 
of different inflows.
Now, as takeovers became more popular in Germany and a market for corporate con-
trol emerged, “classical elements” of the financial system began to fall apart. It all started in 
1999, when the British telecommunication company Vodafone-Airtouch sought control of 
the German industrial giant Mannesmann and a spectacular takeover battle was initiated, 
which would shake the very foundations of the German economic system; a genuine “cul-
10 The term ‘classical’ refers to a bank’s traditional activities in retail banking and credit banking, as will be outlined 
at a later point.
11 The German industry and banking sector is traditionally marked by a high degree of corporate networks. Bank 
officials are often members of their clients’ management and supervisory boards and gain valuable insights into a 
company’s business concept and strategic planning. The involvement of bank personnel in corporate management 
opens access to important information (e.g., a company’s financial standing) necessary for assessing possible risks in 
granting credits.
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tural break”(Seidlitz, 2009). Over the subsequent years, a growing number of middle sized 
companies saw themselves confronted with a “wave of hostile takeovers” (Dohmen, Haw-
ranek & Tietz, 2010) and feared becoming smashed by foreign competitors. 
What is at stake here is nothing less than the core principles of corporate organization. 
As has been discussed by Beyer (2003), takeovers will “cut” the ties between firms and universal 
banks and thus change the way companies procure capital. The argument goes as follows: 
Banks that wish to benefit from the business with takeovers (M&A) have a strong incen-
tive to leave the supervisory boards and decouple themselves from corporate networks. No 
longer does it seem appropriate for a private bank to take on co-entrepreneurial responsibil-
ity given that firms, as they begin to demand external financial resources, seek to enter the 
capital market and change their mode of corporate control according to LME-standards. 
Exemplarily, Beyer (2003, p. 126) cites a case in which the Deutsche Bank supported the 
German company Thyssen-Krupp in their endeavor to takeover a firm, while the bank was 
still part of that firm’s supervisory board and consequently a conflict of interest arose. Banks 
now become “financial intermediaries” slowly quitting the credit business and searching for 
new business areas to engage in, primarily in investment banking. This might seem the most 
notable effect behind the eroding of corporate networks, often referred to as the fall of the 
Deutschland AG (Streeck & Höpner, 2003; Höpner & Krempel, 2004). According to a survey 
published by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies (MPifG) in 2000, roughly 
46% of large German businesses had cut ties to their respective house banks. Only 32% of the 
companies surveyed indicated that they still maintained a strong relationship to their house 
bank (quoted in Beyer, 2003, p. 130 footnote).
Recent data provided by the German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundebank) supports 
the same notion. Based on a brief assessment of the macroeconomic financial accounts for 
Germany, it becomes apparent that the financing structure of German business has deeply 
changed over recent decades. Between 1980 and 2010 German banks across all sectors be-
gan to play a bigger role in international trade with securities and expanded their portfolios 
substantially. 
Table 1: MFIs Assets, 1980 – 2010
1980 1990 2000 2005 2010
Types of assets in Trillion €
Securities from: 0.2 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.5
domestic issuers 0.19 0.59 0.85 0.9 0.9
foerign issuers 0.01 0.04 0.25 0.5 0.6
Loans to**: 2.4 5.5 5.9 6.8 7.4
MFIs 0.5 1.4 1.5 1.9 2.1
domestic 0.4 1.0 1.06 1.1 1.2
foreign 0.1 0.4 0.44 0.8 0.9
non-MFIs 1.4 2.7 2.9 3.0 3.2
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2012)
** book and unsecured credits; data from each December
According to Table 1, revenues from securities issued by both domestic and foreign suppliers 
increased more than sevenfold (from 0.2 to 1.5 trillion €) during that period.
How Europeanization Triggers the Conflict of Capitalism in the German System of Corporate Control
Over the same time, in contrast, total revenues from loans only tripled (from 2.4 to 
7.4 trillion €). The data provided shows a trend towards stock trading rather than an all-
encompassing substitution of credit banking. However, the relative share of stock trading as 
can be inferred from Table 1 has risen from 7.7 to 17% between 1980 and 2010. It is even 
more striking that investments in securities issued by foreign traders has skyrocketed (from 
0.01 to 0.6 trillion €), yet again denoting the banks’ global orientation.
As banks shifted away from the domestic credit business, firms started to raise capital 
from sources other than credit; in fact, “[t]he bank credit (…) has systematically become 
less important over the past 20 years” (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012, p. 13). While internal 
funds (e.g., through classical bank credits) are still the major capital source of companies, the 
share of external funds, including credits from non-banks (e.g. investors, finance houses) has 
substantially increased12. As Table 2 illustrates, the share of bank credits has not been constant 
over time. In 1991 MFI13-loan liabilities accounted for 32% of the balance sheet of German 
business; twenty years later, in 2010, this number had dropped to 18%.
Table 2: Nonfinancial Company Sector Outstanding Liabilities, 1991 – 2010
1991 1995 2000 2005 2010
Type of liability in Billion € 2 042 2 519 3 891 3 944 4 718
in % of total liabilities
Securities other than shares 1.8 2.3 1.4 2.7 3.1
Loans including: 38.1 35.5 29.3 30.3 31.8
from MFIs* 32.0 28.6 22.7 20.9 18.0
from non-MFIs* 6.1 6.9 6.6 9.4 13.8
Technical provisions 5.7 5.6 4.3 5.2 4.8
Other liabilities including: 24.4 21.1 17.0 17.6 17.8
Commercial credits 
and advances
17.1 14.8 10.5 11.3 12.1
Shares 30.0 35.6 48.0 44.1 42.6
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2012)
* MFI = Monetary Financial institution.
During the period in question, banks have been increasingly replaced by alternative 
creditors. At the same time, shares (from 30 to 42.6%) and bonds (from 1.8 to 3.1%) have 
become noticeably attractive to companies. In short, whereas external funds still rely hugely 
on ‘classical’ credits, they are increasingly demanded from creditors other than banks (non-
MFIs). As soon as banks began to switch to investment banking and firms shifted away from 
credit business, the strong bank-entrepreneurial partnership began to fall apart.
4.2. Corporate control and industrial relations
In a similar way to the example given in 4.1., corporate control and the financial system 
12 Generally speaking, companies can raise capital either through internal or external funds. The latter denote the 
sum of a company’s financial resources that do not result from its own retained profits. Most companies usually 
depend on the acquisition of external funds in order to expand business activities or simply to keep them alive.
13 = monetary financial institutions, or roughly translated, banks
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are linked to each other, as are corporate control and industrial relations. This link results 
from the strong inter-firm relationship characterizing most CMEs. Unlike LMEs, firms in 
CMEs are not loosely coupled units that only strive for their own goals, but rather team 
players who maintain strong strategic partnerships with one another. They agree to com-
mit themselves to mutual trust and to certain sector-wide agreements. As soon as corporate 
control is exposed to an opposing business rationale, the system of industrial relations can-
not remain unaffected by this. Similar to the last section, I will first lay out the most crucial 
characteristics of industrial relations in Germany before analyzing how institutional comple-
mentarities account for the steady transformation of corporatism. Change takes place at all 
levels of corporatism, but only the meso- and micro-levels adjustment may be traced back to 
the opening of a market for corporate control.
Corporatism is a key future of coordinated market economies and this holds particular-
ly true for Germany. Most literature distinguishes between three levels of corporatism: meta 
or macro (economy wide), meso (sector level), and micro corporatism (firm level) (Gorges, 
1996). In general, corporatism denotes a system of social organization that involves associa-
tions of homogenous interests into corporate groups, such as labor and business, which take 
part in tripartite negotiation rounds with government. The system of economic macro-
tripartism is believed to achieve a high level of social consensus, political stability and inter-
national competitiveness and has proven a success story particularly in times of economic 
turbulence (Czada, 2004). 
In recent years, the German corporatist system has been under steady attack. While it 
is true that, once instituted, principles of corporatist organization are remarkably resistant to 
any form of transformation pressure – be it internal or external –, some degree of reshaping 
can hardly be denied. At the macro level, labor unions face significant loss of membership 
while business associations find themselves being confronted by the emancipation of their 
single most crucial constituency. Large firms have begun lobbying the government outside 
the association channel and thus further propelled the downswing of associations in general. 
Drawing on recent research, scholars have denoted the ongoing erosion of macro-corpo-
ratism as a shift “from corporatism to lobbyism”14 (von Winter, 2004; von Alemann, 2000). 
This erosion also accounts for the growing variety of lobbying actors, including law firms, 
consultancies, and grassroots movements. Reasons for this development are manifold and 
include, but are not limited to, globalization, Europeanization (see footnote), social modern-
ization, and pluralization. Changes in meso-corporatist arrangements, however, seem to be 
more strongly correlated to one single factor, corporate organization.
Industrial relations at the sector level, once again, reinforce institutional complemen-
tarities in coordinated market economies. A dense inter-firm corporate network has the 
capability to set wages across an industry and will thus reduce any incentive for a company to 
poach employees at a similar skill level from competitors. If wages vary across one sector, em-
14 One factor underpinning this development is Europeanization – here of a different kind. Since political deci-
sion-making has partly shifted away from the nation state to the EU, the institutional target structure of interest 
groups has changed and domestic authorities, while still important, have increasingly lost their attraction to inter-
est groups (Lehmkuhl, 2006). Given the fact, though, that European institutions, primarily in the Commission, 
are accessible to all interest groups and not restricted to major federations only – as is the case in Germany – the 
fundamental openness allows member firms to bypass the ‘association channel’ and lobby the EU on their own. 
This “logic of access” has been thoroughly studied by Bouwen (2002) who provides evidence for the ‘rise’ of large 
firms as important lobbing actors, which has significant implications for both the functioning and organization of 
associations at the domestic level (see also Steeck et al., 2006).
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ployees with access to sensitive information such as production strategies will be willing to 
exploit the company’s vulnerability and ‘sell’ the information to a competitor. Hence compa-
nies want to cooperate and agree on sector-wide wages, working conditions and vocational 
trainings (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Now, the creation of a market for corporate control would “cut” this 
tie between companies. A market for corporate control, as present in LMEs, encourages firms 
to focus primarily on profit maximization and individual rationales. Wages are set according 
to market price mechanisms and employees might be subject to dismissal at any time (‘hire 
and fire’-principle). There is no need for intra-sectoral cooperation as it is fostered in CMEs. 
Furthermore, a market for corporate control implies an increase in hostile takeovers which 
would endanger the principle of mutual trust, a key condition for the stability of industrial 
relations. And finally, what would be the prospect of corporatist codetermination in a firm 
in which the shareholder has the final say?  
Recent studies provide evidence for the notion that wage organization – confirming 
earlier expectations – has been decentralized and particularly shifted from multi-employ-
er-bargaining to single-employer-bargaining (Traxler, 2004). This finding suggests a trend 
towards disorganization, which came up “when wage regulation came under neo-liberal 
pressure” (Traxler, 2004, p. 580). As Figure 2 shows, collective bargaining coverage has dra-
matically decreased over the past two decades and this trend is likely to continue. A compre-
hensive study undertaken by the WSI-Institute (2010) further suggests that firms have more 
and more tried to opt out of existing agreements, or when this was not possible have decided 
not to extend them.
Figure 2: Collective Bargaining Coverage in Germany 1998 – 2009, in % of all 
employees covered by an agreement
Source: Based on Bispinck, R., Dribbusch, H. & Schulten, T. (2010, p. 3)
While Traxler (2004) urges us not to overemphasize these observations, as he believes 
path dependency will shield (macro-) corporatist arrangements from adjustment pressure, 
they still have significant implications for the system of industrial relations as a whole. For 
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2012/iss1/8
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 91
example, if wages are increasingly set at the firm- or plant-level rather than the industry- or 
sector level, one must assume that differences in salaries across a sector will sharply increase. 
In fact, studies have shown that the degree of wage centralization is a statistically relevant 
determinant of pay inequality (Wallerstein, 1999) and that sectoral wage differentials have 
gone an upward trend (Bellmann & Gartner, 2003).
Second, co-determination15 in privately owned companies both in West and East Ger-
many has dropped from 41% in 1996 to 29% in 2011, according to recent data from the Hans 
Boeckler Foundation (2012). Finally, all that suggests that corporatism is eroding slowly not 
only at the macro- but also at the meso- and micro-levels of society.
5. Conclusion
Over the last several decades, the German state has undergone major changes. Basic 
aspects of the capitalist system have been affected by these changes and do not appear to 
shift back towards their past equilibrium. It comes somewhat as a surprise that the ‘German 
model’ has so profoundly eroded, given that scholars most commonly referred to Germany 
as a paradigm case for institutional stability and economic prosperity. The most striking 
evidence can be found for the decentralization of the financial system and the system of 
industrial relations, each connoting key features of Germany’s coordinated market economy. 
While these observations should not be overgeneralized, they clearly mark a trend towards 
convergence to the US model of capitalism.
What has this change caused and why are the various change processes obviously 
correlated? These were the two questions that served as a guideline through my paper, and 
I addressed them in the following way. First, the basic assumption underlying this paper 
was that not (only) internationalization has put adjustment pressure on Germany’s market 
economy, but Europeanization. I contended in favor of an analysis that aims at bringing the 
EU “back to the table” when searching for causes of domestic change. Unlike internation-
alization, I argued, Europeanization denotes a whole set of mechanisms that are at work to 
reshape the nation state. Europeanization is binding, has a larger magnitude and is politically 
intended, hence self-induced by the member states. Second, if one core element of a coordi-
nated market economy is under attack, say by EU legislation, so are the others. Institutional 
complementarities as defined by the “Varieties of Capitalism” approach account for the high 
degree of mutual dependency between single elements of an economy and thus needs to be 
considered in such an analysis. 
The present study contributes to the Europeanization debate in a way that links the de-
bate to recent research in the field of capitalist diversity. Such an approach may not only help 
to broaden our understanding of the effects of EU integration; it also stresses the political 
dimension of the ‘clash of capitalisms’. Furthermore, the study advocates an alternative per-
spective to the debate on the erosion of corporatism in Germany. While it is widely believed 
that ‘societal modernization’ accounts for the slow yet steady decentralization of corporatist 
arrangements, this paper has traced change back to the micro-level of society. Because the 
EU has been extensively involved in creating a Europe wide market for corporate control, 
these developments have caused the German system of industrial relations (along with the 
financial system) to slowly fall apart. In fact, the ‘German Model’ as a whole is being faced 
with substantial adjustment pressure, and there is no reason to believe that this process will 
15 In combination with a collective agreement
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not forge ahead. If Europeanization continues the former German model is doomed to fade 
away in favor for a less just but more competitive system.
Author's Notes
This study was part of my senior thesis paper, which will be submitted to the University 
of Potsdam in July 2012. I would like to thank Professor Ron Rogowski (UCLA) for hosting 
this research and Cora Zeugmann for valuable comments.
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